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Abstract: This paper presents a SWOT analysis of the impact of recent EU regulatory changes on 
the business case for energy storage (ES) using the UK as a case study. ES technologies (such as 
batteries) are key enablers for increasing the share of renewable energy generation and hence 
decarbonising the electricity system. As such, recent regulatory changes seek to improve the 
business case for ES technologies on national networks. These changes include removing double 
network charging for ES, defining and classifying ES in relevant legislations, clarifying ES 
ownership along with facilitating its grid access. However, most of the current regulations treat 
storage in a similar way to bulk generators without paying attention to the different sizes and types 
of ES. As a result, storage with higher capacity receives significantly higher payment in the capacity 
market and can be exempt from paying renewable energy promotion taxes. Despite the recent 
regulatory changes, ES is defined as a generation device, which is a barrier to a wide range of 
revenue streams from demand side services. Also, regulators avoid to disrupt the current energy 
market structure by creating an independent asset class for ES. Instead, they are encouraging 
changes that co-exist with the current market and regulatory structure. Therefore, although some of 
the reviewed market and regulatory changes for ES in this paper are positive, it can be concluded 
that these changes are not likely to allow a level playing field for ES that encourage its increase on 
energy networks. 
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1. Introduction 
Climate change concerns are encouraging the international community to adopt policies to 
decarbonise the energy system by increasing the reliance on renewable energy sources (RES) such as 
wind and solar [1]. EU policies, for example, aim to increase the total consumed energy provided by 
RES to 20% in 2020 and 50% in 2050 [2,3]. Reflecting this the total installed wind and solar energy 
capacity in the EU-28 countries increased by 104.1 GW and 100.4 GW in the last 10 years respectively 
[4]. By 2030, it is expected that the total wind and solar installed capacity in the EU will reach 327 GW 
and 270 GW respectively [5]. This increased penetration of RES in the electricity system poses 
network balance challenges to grid operators due to the intermittent nature of many clean energy 
sources such as PV and Wind turbines [6–8]. Also, it leads to increased reserve capacity [9], increased 
electricity system costs [10] and reduced system adequacy [11]. To ensure power system stability 
while allowing high share of RES, several methods have been utilised such as demand side 
management [12], the introduction of capacity markets [13], and smart grid initiatives [14]. 
Energy storage (ES) is widely recognised as key to resolve RES’s intermittency by enabling 
electrical energy to be stored at the off-peak times and released during peak demand periods [15]. It 
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is expected that the total global ES capacity needs to be tripled to reach 15.72 TWh if the share of RES 
is to be doubled in the energy system by 2030 [16]. Many studies evaluated the technical, economic 
and environmental performance for ES systems to identify their suitability to various grid 
applications [17–20]. 
Amongst the different types of ES systems, battery energy storage system (BESS) is interesting 
because of their suitability to many applications in grid connected electricity networks such as peak 
shaving [21], energy arbitrage [22], reserve capacity [23], frequency regulation [24] amongst many 
others. Furthermore, battery materials are constantly improving over the years to account for 
degradation [25] and its capital cost is expected to decrease over the next years. Bloomberg, predicts 
that the price of battery energy storage system (BESS) for grid applications will be $70/kWh by 2030 
in line with market growth for ES represented by $620bn investment by 2040 [26]. As such, this work 
is concerned with BESS in particular when analyzing market and regulatory changes and the different 
types of ES is beyond the scope of this paper. 
BESS has the opportunity to provide different services across the electrical network if these 
services are technologically and operationally compatible [27]. However, despite these benefits, 
large-scale deployment of BESS on EU energy networks is hindered due to regulatory and market 
barriers that prevent storage from stacking multiple services across different markets [28,29]. Recent 
research [30] analysed the business model of two different BESSs and concluded that the current 
legislation in Europe hinders their value proposition in energy markets. Other researchers argued 
that the current regulatory framework forces storage developers to choose certain business models 
which may not be economically feasible [31]. The argument being that a reduction in capital cost of 
BESS technologies alone will not lead to an increase in their applications on energy networks [16]. As 
such, there is a need to mitigate market and regulatory barriers to make BESS commercially viable in 
different markets. 
Energy regulators recognise the necessity of ES in modern energy networks and are exploring 
ways to enhance its business case. The European Commission (EC) recognises ES as a key component 
to accelerate clean energy transformation and is proposing a number of regulatory changes in [32]. 
Some of which have been adopted by UK’s energy regulator (OFGEM) including: (i) defining 
‘Electricity Storage’ in the main legislation; (ii) removing double network and balancing charges for 
storage; (iii) co-locating storage with renewable generation sites that are supported through 
consumption levies policies; (iv) limiting storage operation by network owners; (v) facilitating ES 
planning permission and, (vi) employing de-rating factors for storage in the capacity market (CM) 
[33]. 
The research presented here reviews the current proposals to amend the regulations governing 
ES and explores how these changes impact on business models for BESS taking the UK’s regulator 
changes as a case study. This study applies the ‘SWOT’ analysis to examine the strengths (S), 
weaknesses (W), opportunities (O), and threats (T) of the future regulatory framework of ES in the 
UK and, by extension in the EU since the regulatory changes are similar. Qualitative data from the 
EC, the UK government, energy regulators, journal articles, and reports are utilised to examine the 
internal (S/W) and external (O/T) factors concerning the proposed regulatory changes. Such analysis 
is vital to provide ES with a clearer insight into the regulatory framework surrounding future 
business cases for ES. 
It should be noted that although we analyse the impact of the recent market and regulatory 
changes on the business case of BESS in particular, energy regulators are taking neutral approach. 
Thus the recent regulatory changes designed to support an increased use of ES on energy networks 
are equal for all types of ES including BESS. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provide an overview for ES 
classification, Section 3 reviews the main market/regulatory aspects that affect the business case of 
BESS and the regulators’ proposed solutions. Section 4 presents SWOT analysis as a method. Section 
5 presents and discusses SWOT analysis results. Section 6 provides a summary of the paper’s findings 
and discusses the ‘Brexit’ issue and Section 7 provides concluding remarks. 
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2. Energy Storage Classification 
ES devices can convert electrical energy into several forms that can be stored and converted back 
to electrical energy again. The main types of ES systems can be categorised based on their storage 
form, storage size, discharge time along with their applications. These are illustrated in Figure 1. The 
main types of ES depending on the stored energy are mechanical, thermal, electrochemical, hydrogen 
and electrical. Depending on the application needed, the amount of energy/power required, the 
application suitable discharge/charge time, a suitable storage type can be chosen. For instance, 
Pumped Hydro Storage (PHS) provides bulk power management normally associated with the 
electricity generation plants. 
It can also be seen from Figure 1 that BESS represented by the different types of batteries can 
provide services across all the electricity network whether it is for short duration power supply, 
transmission/distribution or bulk power management. Recently, Lithium ion batteries have been 
used also to provide 100 MW bulk power management for the electricity grid in South Australia [34]. 
Many network operators use BESS to support grid reliability and initiate services to help BESS 
quantify its value. For example, a number of distribution network operators (DNOs) in the UK have 
successfully piloted several BESS technologies for different grid applications; peak shaving, voltage 
support, and renewable constraint management [35]. Therefore, the market and regulatory changes 
needed to increase the share of ES on energy networks should consider the different types, 
applications, and capability of ES. 
 
Figure 1. Classification of energy storage systems by the form of stored energy along with their power 
capacity, discharge time, and applications, adopted from [36]. 
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3. Market and Regulatory Changes for Energy Storage 
Market and regulatory barriers for ES in the EU and UK level are summarised in Table 1 as 
reported in earlier research. The following subsections analyse recent EU and UK regulatory changes 
that are being considered and/or implemented to mitigate some of these barriers. 
Table 1. The main regulatory and market barriers for Energy Storage deployment in the EU/UK. 
The barrier to Energy Storage deployment References 
The absence of ES definition and classification  [29,37–47] 
Storage ownership by network operators  [37,38,40,41,43,45,46,48,49] 
Payment of double network fees [29,37,38,41,44,46,50,51] 
Payment of final consumption levies (FCLs) [37,38,43,46] 
Lack of ancillary services remuneration  [29,37–41,43,52] 
Reserve market requirements [29,38,39,45] 
Fixed electricity pricing [37,43,53] 
Absence of direct subsides  [29,38] 
3.1. Definiation and Classification of Energy Storage 
ES is not explicitly defined in most electricity markets as an activity or an asset. Therefore, it 
differs from other activities in the electricity market such as generation, transmission, distribution 
and supply. Historically PHS is classified as a generation asset. This has resulted in all types of ES 
being classified as a generation asset. According EU Directive 2009/72/EC ES is an “asset that 
produces electricity”. Similarly, the UK Electricity Act 1989 provides a broad definition of the process 
of electricity generation as “generating at a relevant place”. While this definition and classification 
may be adequate for large-scale ES such as PHS it poses investment risks for BESS because it limits 
the applications that ES can provide to those relating to generation. 
BESS have shorter lifecycle and lower energy capacity than PHS [54] making them suitable to 
help network operators effectively manage distribution and transmission networks in line with 
integrating distributed generators. Therefore, some network operators suggest creating an 
independent asset class to ES that identify storage as a solution to integrate RES rather than 
competing with traditional generation [55]. Other network operator proposed many solutions to the 
storage definition barrier for BESS by suggesting [56]: 
 Defining storage as a discrete activity or asset class to ensure investment certainty. 
 Introduce storage provisions within the distribution license so network operators can be free 
from some generation license rules. 
EC proposed a definition for ES states that "Energy storage in the electricity system means the 
deferring of an amount of the energy that was generated to the moment of use, either as final energy 
or converted into another energy carrier" [32]. Similarly, OFGEM’s proposed definition states that 
“Electricity Storage in the electricity system is the conversion of electrical energy into a form of energy 
which can be stored, the storing of that energy, and the subsequent reconversion of that energy back 
into electrical energy in a controllable manner”[57]. Both OFGEM and EC believe that storage should 
continue to be captured by the generation license in order not to distort competition. 
3.2. The Interaction of Storage with Final Consumption Levies 
The competitiveness of ES technologies are affected by policies that encourage RES deployment. 
For example, in Germany, there is no incentive for wind farm operators to store the energy generated 
because they are paid 95–100% of the relevant wind Feed in Tariff (FiT) for the curtailment of that 
energy [46,58]. In the UK, FiT, Renewables Obligation (RO), Contract for Difference (CfD) and 
Climate Change levy (CCL) are examples of FCLs policies introduced to encourage the deployment 
of RES. Consumers and storage are charged these levies storage when importing electricity. However, 
it is argued that ES is not the final consumer of energy and should be exempted from such levies that 
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increase the operational cost for storage owners [33]. It is found that the cost of RO and FiT levies 
accounts for 80% of all non-energy related supply costs when charging a commercial grid-scale 
battery [59]. OFGEM recently proposed that any storage owner with the new modified generation 
license (that define ES and its characteristics) could be exempted from paying those FCLs, if the main 
purpose of storage is to export electricity to the grid only (not for a self-consumption) [57]. If, 
however, an owner is exempted from obtaining a generation license, the payment of FCLs is still 
required (A generator and by extension a storage device could be exempted from applying for a license if it is 
generating at a rate below 100 MW in England and Wales). 
3.2.1. Energy Storage Treatment in FiT/RO sites 
FiT is a scheme used to encourage customers and businesses to generate their own electricity 
from RES and be paid if there is energy surplus. RO works alongside FIT where electricity suppliers 
are obliged to buy certain amount of electricity generated by large renewable generation plants. In 
both FiT and RO schemes, the technology type used, its installation and capacity play a role in 
deciding the tariff rate, eligibility criteria and consequently the payment received by the owner 
[60,61]. Since the storage is essential for some technologies such as solar PV, it is the case of putting 
the accreditation at risk if storage is installed on FiT/RO sites. For example, if a battery is integrated 
with a PV solar site and a metering arrangement installed in a way that lead the owner to receive 
payments from the electricity exported from the grid to the storage. 
OFGEM’S recent regulations state that storage installation in FiT/RO sites should to be permitted 
if the purpose of storage is to store electricity generated by renewable sources only and if the total 
contracted capacity is not changed [62,63]. To comply with these conditions, certain electricity meter 
arrangements need to be in place to distinguish between the imported and exported electricity. 
3.2.2. Energy Storage Treatment under CfD 
The basis of CfD contract is to receive payment on the (clean) electricity generated by the CfD 
facility. Hence, if storage is defined within that CfD facility, there is a possibility of electricity to be 
imported from the grid – which cannot be necessarily generated by RES- and poured into it at another 
time (export time) which compromise the contract. 
Two proposed options were introduced to mitigate this problem by the UK government [64]. 
First, any storage device in a CfD facility needs to be registered in a separate metering unit to ensure 
storage independency of the CfD facility. Second, storage can be registered in the same metering unit 
of a CfD facility only if certain metering arrangements are in place that prevents storing electricity 
other than that generated by the CfD facility generation equipment. 
3.2.3. Energy Storage Interaction with the CCL 
A climate change levy exempt certificate (LEC) can be issued if the electricity is generated by 
RES. Therefore, if ES device imports electricity (from non-LEC generator) then a CCL is applicable. 
The worst scenario if ES imported electricity (from non-LEC generator) and then exports that 
electricity to an industrial user, a double CCL will be incurred by the end-user.  
There is no regulatory clarification from the UK government about the above issue. However, 
based on the aforementioned regulatory changes, it is expected that storage will not pay the CCL 
when importing electricity but still pays the CCL as a generator. 
3.3. Network Charges for Energy Storage 
Generators, suppliers and consumers of electricity are required to pay network and balancing 
charges to cover the ongoing network costs. With the absence of clear EU legislation regarding the 
charging arrangement of ES, some countries (the UK, France, Germany, The Netherlands) impose 
double network charges for ES once when charging and the other when discharging [65]. 
In the UK, if the storage capacity is above 100 MW (large-scale), two sets of Transmission 
Network Use of System (TNUoS) and Balancing Services Use of System (BSUoS) charges are incurred 
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by the storage if it is connected on the transmission network. If the storage capacity below 100 MW 
(small-scale) and connected on the distribution network, only Distribution Use of Services (DUoS) 
charges will be paid either based on the Common Distribution Charging Methodology (CDCM) or 
Extra High Voltage Distribution Charging Methodology (EDCM) rates. However, the current 
distribution charging methodology seems inconsistent. For instance, the CDCM charge for a recent 
storage project over eight months was £54,149 while the EDCM charges over the same period was 
£10,668 [56]. Therefore, connecting storage to extra voltage lines is more cost-effective than high 
voltage lines. 
OFGEM presented several solutions for the charges discusses above, to support a level playing 
field for ES as equal to other generation technologies [66,67].These changes are listed below and 
presented in Figure 2. 
 Removing the TNUoS demand and generation residual charges; 
 Removing DUoS demand residual charges; 
 Removing BSUoS demand charges; 
 Introducing new fixed charges to cover the increased implementation of ‘behind the meter’ 
storage. 
 
Figure 2. Network and Balancing system charges in the UK’s electricity system, adopted from [68]. 
(x) means removed for ES per new legislations. 
3.4. The Treatment of Energy Storage in the Capacity Market 
The participation of ES in the CM is important to its business case [69] . Yet, the ability of ES to 
provide the necessary energy adequacy has been questioned due to its limited discharge capacity. As 
such, ES participation in this market is limited in some EU markets (for example, Ireland, Italy, 
Germany, France, Denmark, and the UK) [45]. For instance, ES was secured a total of 3.2 GW in the 
UK’s CM Tier-4 (Tier-4 (T-4) auction is held four years ahead of delivery while Tier -1 (T-1) is held 
one year ahead of delivery) auction in 2016 in which 0.5 GW comes from BESS [70]. In 2017, a study 
by the system operator found that a stress event could last for 2 hours in the UK while the maximum 
duration of the current storage response is 30 minutes. This leads to linking the de-rating factor to 
the maximum discharge duration of storage [71], which means that maximum payment that a 0.5 h 
duration storage can receive is only 21.34% compared to 96.11% payment for a 4h+ duration storage. 
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3.5. Energy Storage Ownership 
The typical liberalised electricity market structure is illustrated in Figure 3. In this structure, 
transmission and distribution network operators (DNO, TNO) are legally required to separate 
network and non-network activities so as not to distort competition, which is referred to as 
‘Unbundling’. As storage is defined as a generation asset, this means that network owners cannot 
own, develop, manage or operate storage assets for grid balancing or reinforcement under the EU 
rules, other than in the case of a few exceptions [72]. However, there is a lack of clarity regarding 
these exceptional circumstances leading to this rule being implemented differently in different EU’s 
member states. For example, In the UK, if ES capacity is less than 100 MW, network operators can 
apply for a generation license exemption thus owning storage [31]. Also, the Italian system operator 
(Terna) is granted permission to own and implement several ES projects to relieve the transmission 
network congestion [73]. This unclear ownership and operation status of ES creates uncertain 
investment environment particularly for network operators. 
OFGEM aims, in line with the EC proposals, to strengthen the unbundling requirement by 
requiring separation of operation for storage assets owned by network operators even if it is below 
100 MW (license exempted) while considering preventing DNO’s ownership to storage in near future 
[32,74]. Consequently, for now, storage can exceptionally be owned by network operators to provide 
services but not for trading in the electricity markets or provide balancing services. 
 
Figure 3. Example of a liberalised electricity market structure. 
3.6. Energy Storage Planning System 
When network operators identify ES as a key solution to provide services to the network or 
prevents costly network expansions, ensuring access to infrastructure with appropriate time scale by 
the planning regimes is important. The EC is clear that storage should be granted access to grid 
infrastructure in a non-discriminatory way. Large-scale ES projects, which are above 225 MW are 
included in the EU's cross-border infrastructure projects that link the energy system in at least two 
EU countries [75]. However, it remains unclear how small-scale ES such as BESS is to be treated in 
the planning system. 
At the UK level, the government published a consultation to clarify the planning regimes for 
energy storage (small and large-scale) as follows [76]: 
 If ES capacity is below 50 MW, the storage developer obtains planning consent from the local 
council. 
 If ES capacity is above 50 MW, it is regarded as nationally significant infrastructure project thus 
storage owners obtain consent from the government. 
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 If storage is included in a composite project with other form of generation, and the capacity of 
each of this installation is below 50 MW, this falls under the local planning regime. 
4. SWOT Analysis Method 
Earlier research published in [38] categorised sixteen investment barriers that can be linked to 
four main regulatory and public attitudes barriers for ES. Since then, energy regulators in the EU and 
UK have acted to mitigate some of these barriers as detailed in the previous section. However, for the 
previous discussions it is evident that the future of ES in national networks is not clear due to complex 
and interlinked market and regulatory changes. In an attempt to add further clarity to this issue, this 
study presents a SWOT analysis to highlight the future business potential of BESS in the future 
considering the recent market and regulatory changes. 
A SWOT analysis, although criticised [77], is a widely used strategic planning tool that supports 
business to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities of a proposed project [78]. 
Within research into energy networks it has been used to assess energy technologies [79], evaluate 
national policies [80] and assess international policies [81]. 
The SWOT analysis examines helpful and harmful aspects of the recent regulatory changes. The 
internal factors (Strengths/Weaknesses) are the direct regulatory and market changes proposed by 
energy regulators that affecting storage’s business avenue. External factors (Opportunities/Threats) 
are those affecting storage’s business potential because of the indirect aspects beyond the stated 
market and regulatory changes. It should be noted however that SWOT analysis may provide 
incomplete qualitative examination such that the assessment may be subjective. As such, in this 
paper, all the SWOT analysis assessments will be supported by earlier research or quantitative 
reports. 
5. Results 
Table 2 provides the results and the general structure of SWOT analysis while more details and 
discussions of the results are provided below. 
5.1. Strengths  
5.1.1. Removing Double Network Charges 
The network and balancing system charges need to be included and paid by ES owners as part 
of operational cost for importing/exporting electricity to the grid. For example, the total cost of DUoS 
charges for one ES project owned by a DNO found to be between £64,900 to £80,500 per annum which 
is not cost-reflective [82]. Moreover, the TNUoS demand and generation residual charges represent 
approximately 80% of the total transmission network charges [68]. As such, removing these charges 
is a step forward towards reducing the operational cost for ES. 
5.1.2. Energy Storage Co-location with Final Consumption Levies Sites 
Policies that support the deployment of low carbon technologies such as FiT and RO have 
significantly increased the uptake of RES across EU countries [83]. This makes ES co-location with 
RES essential to match the electricity supply and demand [84]. The new OFGEM regulations allowed 
ES to be co-located with FCLs sites without compromising the accreditation of these schemes. This 
triggered many positive responses from the industry and trade associations because this means, for 
example, that home PV owners, can install ES without the fear of compromising FiT payment scheme 
[85]. 
Table 2. SWOT analysis of the market/regulatory changes for ES in the UK. 
Factors Helpful to storage business case Harmful to storage business case 
Internal 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Removing double network charges  ES definition and classification 
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 ES co-location with FCLs sites 
 Facilitating grid access for ES 
 Strengthen the unbundling 
requirements  
 Payment of FCLs for small-scale ES 
(100 MW) 
 Employing de-rating factors in the 
capacity market 
 Introducing fixed charges for behind 
the meter ES 
External 
Opportunities Threats 
 Encouraging private parties’ 
investment in ES 
 Ancillary services aggregation 
 High capital cost 
 Cannibalisation of revenue streams 
available for ES 
5.1.3. Facilitating Grid Access for Energy Storage 
One of the factors affecting the investment decision in ES is the infrastructure access for the 
device and consequently the planning application. As discussed earlier, OFGEM has recently 
facilitated the planning regimes for ES technologies with a capacity below 50 MW by allowing ES 
developers to obtain planning permission from the local council. This is positive legislation for two 
reasons. First, the average capacity of the current and planned ES technologies projects is 27 MW 
which is significantly below 50 MW [86]. Second, the composite projects that have total capacity 
above 50 MW (for example a generation unit with 40 MW and ES with 40 MW) are also applying for 
planning permission from the local council. This reduces the additional consent time (1–2 years) as 
well as the cost of application when compared to the application set at the national level [76]. 
5.2. Weaknesses 
5.2.1. Energy Storage Definition and Classification 
A unified and explicit definition for ES in the related legislations is a basic step to create certain 
investment environment. This clarifies the ownership and operation issues for ES. It also allows ES 
owners to have a clearer view over the available revenue streams during ES lifetime. However, ES 
definition proposed by both the EC and OFGEM limits its services related to generation. For instance, 
if a battery is used to curtail a wind turbine’s surplus energy, it is exporting rather than generation 
electricity which is a service to balance the system. The word ‘generated’ in the EU definition (see 
Section 3.1) implies that ES is a generation asset and therefore does not recognise other potential 
services and applications (please see Figure 1). 
Classifying BESS as a generation asset puts it in direct competition with traditional bulk 
generators. This undermines its business case because BESS cannot trade in a large wholesale market 
as a generation asset due to its low capacity and low technical maturity [40]. Moreover, a unified ES 
definition is absent at the EU level due to national differences which prevents a fully integrated EU 
market design [37]. 
The current EU and UK ES definitions and classifications fall short behind California state 
legislation of ES services. The Assembly Bill No 2514 provides the following list of conditions 
applicable to ES that allows it to provide multiple services across the electricity network [87]: 
 The ES system can be centralised or distributed. 
 The ES system may be owned by a load serving entity, a customer, a third party or local publicly 
owned electric utility. 
 ES system can provide generation, transmission and distribution services. 
5.2.2. Strengthen the Unbundling Requirements 
If network operators are prevented from owning ES of any size, all ES devices connected to the 
distributing or transmission network will have to be operated by a legally separate party from the 
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network operators. However, many DNOs have already installed ES devices in parts of their 
networks to defer conventional network upgrade and provide ancillary services. The latter have been 
shown to reduce the energy costs for customers and enhance network efficiency [35]. Some of the ES 
projects in the UK including their capacity, locations, ES type, and the type of the business model 
used are summarised in Table 3 [88–94]. Based on Table 3, two weaknesses can be noticed to this 
regulatory change. First, most of DNOs are using smaller size BESSs to increase network efficiency 
based on the ‘DNO merchant’ (This business model allows the DNO to procure and fully operate the 
storage device thus use the storage services on its network and needs.) business model which will 
not be legally valid if strengthening the unbundling requirements comes into force. Second, even 
though DNOs used ‘DNO contracted’ (The DNO procures, owns and operate the storage asset and 
use it in certain times only while a third party can have a contractual agreement with the DNO to 
commercially use the asset.) and ‘contracted services’ (A third party procures, owns and operate the 
storage asset then sell the services to the DNO.) business models for larger size BESS, they needed to 
enter into complex contractual agreement with third parties to make revenue streams in the market 
because each party involved with the DNO need to make a profit which reduces the overall revenue. 
5.2.3. Payment of FCLs for small-scale ES 
Large-scale ES are exempted from paying FCLs which is seen as positive in determining its 
commercial availability [95]. However, this is not in favor of BESS given that the power is 50 MW for 
the largest battery energy storage project in Europe [96] and the average capacity of the current and 
planned ES technologies projects is 27 MW [86]. It has been demonstrated that the payment of these 
FCLs by ES can cost up to £20k–£50k per annum for the SNS project in Table 3 and makes the project’s 
business model unprofitable outside the peak demand months [89]. 
5.2.4. Employing De-rating Factors in the Capacity Market 
Before introducing the de-rating factors to ES in this market, its participation was not penalised 
according to its discharge capacity which meant that all storage devices received full payment of the 
clearing price. However, due to de-rating factor changes, discussed in Section 3.4, BESS participation 
in this market has decreased. For instance, in the T-4 auction of 2018, only 158 MW of BESS have 
secured a contract compared to 500 MW in the previous auction [97]. As depicted in Figure 4, the 
number of 0.5h and 1h duration batteries decreased from 40 and 91 in T-1 2018 auction to 17 and 32 
in the T-1 2019 auction respectively. Moreover, the number of 1.5 h duration batteries increased from 
8 in the T-4 2021 to 18 in the T-4 2022. This is in line with first time appearance of 11 and 2 batteries 
providing 3h and 4h discharge duration respectively. The decline in the shorter duration storage (0.5h 
and 1h) and the increase in longer duration storage (1.5 h, 3 h, 4 h) may be as a result of other services 
commitments. However, it is an indication of a regulatory change that encourages the battery 
industry to increase its energy and power density by introducing higher payment for longer duration 
storage. 
A basic rule of the CM requires participants to remain ready in case of a system stress event. 
This means that storage must be fully charged at all-time thus increasing its rate of degradation. This 
is one of the main barriers to BESS in the CM [38]. However, the degradation economic losses are 
neither remunerated nor studied in the de-rating factor study by the system operator [71]. 
Table 3. Some of BESS projects in the UK including their capacity, locations, type, DNO name, and 
the type of the business model. 
Project Name  Capacity and Locations ES DNO  Type of BM  
CLNR RiseCarr: 5 MWh, H.Ngate: 
0.2 MWh 
WoolerRamsay: 0.2 MWh 
Maltby: 0.1 MWh, 
Wooler St. Mary: 0.1 MWh 
Li-ion NPG DNO 
Merchant 
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Figure 4. The number of batteries participating in the UK's capacity market from T-1 2018 to T-4 2022 
as reported in the CM register (adopted from [98]). 
5.2.5. Introducing Fixed Charges for Behind the Meter Energy Storage 
Behind the meter storage is normally used to reduce the electricity bill for commercial users. 
They are normally charged based on their consumption during the peak demand periods. But 
because more users and businesses are able to predict these periods, they reduce their exposure to 
these charges when reducing their consumption due to using ES or demand side management 
techniques. Thus, OFGEM introduced fixed consumption charges although users can reduce the 
network charges for themselves, other electricity users need to compensate and cover the network 
fixed cost. This would seem to suggest that storage is regarded by energy regulators as a disruptive 
technology that can displace the existing energy regime [99]. 
5.3. Opportunities  
5.3.1. Encouraging Private Parties’ Investment in Energy Storage 
Energy regulators in most liberalised countries are seeking to encourage competition between 
energy sector entities and regulate the revenue for market monopolies. The ES applications that can 
be provided by each electricity market entity are summarised in Table 4. It can be seen that private 
operators under the current market arrangements can provide all ES applications compared to other 
actors. As discussed in Section 3.5, energy regulators are considering strict unbundling requirements. 
Therefore, TSOs and DNOs will need to procure these services from the private sector that is 
increasingly interested in investing in ES [99]. 
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Table 4. ES applications mapped to electricity industry actors [35]. 
Application DNO TSO Energy supplier Generators Private operators 
Energy Arbitrage x x    
Peak shaving  x x x  
Voltage support   x x  
Constraint management  x x   
System balancing x x    
Portfolio balancing services  x x    
5.3.2. Ancillary Services Aggregation 
The act of aggregation refers to the grouping of several units (consumers, or prosumers) in the 
power system to act as a single entity when trading in the electricity market [100]. Several studies 
identified the role of aggregators for ES in providing different services in the energy markets. 
However, the business case for aggregators is seen as hampered by the regulatory frameworks that 
prevents wider market access [41,101,102]. In 2016, the EC required member states to facilitate direct 
market access to the retail market [103]. Similarly, OFGEM identified some of the barriers to service 
aggregation and acted to amend some of the balancing market codes to allow aggregators to stack 
multiple revenue streams from different services [104]. 
5.4. Threats 
5.4.1. High Capital Cost 
Although the capital cost of BESS continues to fall, a recent study found that a cumulative 
investment of US$175–510 billion is needed in order for the capital cost of battery packs reaches 
US$175 ± 25/kWh which is expected between 2027–2040 [105]. In another study, battery technology 
experts found that even with the recent advances in battery pack manufacturing capabilities and 
chemistry changes, the battery pack cost will not significantly decrease by 2020 [106]. As a result, a 
capital cost barrier is still a threat to the potential market growth of many BESSs. 
5.4.2. Cannibalisation of Revenue Streams Available for Energy Storage 
With the increased deployment of ES technologies combined with the necessity for a sustainable 
business case, there is a risk of revenue streams cannibalisation as a result of market competition. 
This risk is considered in the UK’s system operator studies when the forecast of ES deployment falls 
from 18.3 GW by 2040 to 10.7 GW by 2050 [107]. 
6. Summary and Brexit Discussion 
This section offers a summary to the obtained results in Table 2. It also discusses the ‘Brexit’ 
issue on the policy implication for both the EU and the UK with regard to ES. Table 2 shows that the 
current ES policy have both strengths and weaknesses. Also, it shows an indirect implication to this 
policy represented by some threats and opportunities. 
One of the main strength points of the UK’s ES policy is the reduction of the operational cost for 
ES devices due to the removal of double network charges in the electricity markets. This is backed up 
by facilitating the planning permission for ES devices on national and local scale. Another ES enabler 
factor is the co-location of ES devices with FiT and RO supporting schemes which is a step forward 
in recognizing ES as a key enabler to greener electricity systems. 
In terms of the weaknesses, energy storage definition limits ES role to generation only while this 
generation classification prevents wide range of other revenue streams. Other barriers are preventing 
network owners from owning and operating ES from all sizes, payment of FCLs for small scale ES 
introducing fixed charged for behind the meter storage and de-rating the ES’s capacity in the capacity. 
These barriers can reduce the overall profit for ES assets. 
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Despite the aforementioned weaknesses, a number of opportunities arises. For instance, 
strengthening the ‘unbundling’ requirements for network owners can encourage private parties to 
invest in ES and stack multiple revenues from different services. Another opportunity is the shift 
towards allowing multiple smaller scale ES assets to be aggregated together to provide vital ancillary 
services. Although stacking multiple revenue may be attractive for all ES assets, a threat of 
cannibalisation of the available revenue streams by all ES assets may occur. Another threat is the 
current high capital cost of ES. 
The above analysed SWOT factors and their effects on ES’s business case can be hugely changed 
due to the UK’s exit from the EU (Brexit). The UK’s electricity markets and the regulatory landscape 
are currently compliant with the EU regulation. Indeed, some studies such as in [108] analysed the 
implications of Brexit on the electricity sector and how could the UK lose the economic benefits of the 
interconnectors of some EU countries. These interconnectors usually provide valuable services to the 
UK’s electricity network by managing intermittent RESs. In case of a Brexit agreement that does not 
involve electricity market integration or interconnector share, there is a significant need for ES and 
other flexibility options to mitigate RESs intermittency [109]. Therefore, it seems that Brexit can raise 
the deployment of ES devices in the UK. Recent study also confirmed this finding by stating that the 
economic investment in large scale ES to increase the UK’s peaking capacity may be boosted without 
the EU’s interconnectors sharing [110]. 
In case of a Brexit scenario that limits the UK’s access to the EU’s single market or a trade 
arrangement that sees tariffs are imposed between the UK and the bloc, importing batteries from the 
EU may not be cost-effective to meet the local UK’s demand. Therefore, the UK government should 
adopt policies to build battery gigafactories in the UK to cover the local demand whether it is for 
electric vehicles or the grid. The Faraday institution estimates that at least 8 gigafactories are needed 
in the UK by 2040 [111]. 
7. Conclusion 
ES is recognised as a key technology to mitigate the intermittency of many RES. Earlier research 
has found many barriers to the rollout of ES in current energy networks. Since 2017, energy regulators 
in the EU and the UK proposed changes to enable a level playing field for ES and remove these 
barriers. The changes include (i) defining ‘Electricity Storage’ in the main legislation; (ii) removing 
double network and balancing charges for storage; (iii) co-locating storage with renewable generation 
sites that are supported through consumption levies policies; (iv) limiting storage operation by 
network owners; (v) facilitating ES planning permission and, (vi) employing de-rating factors for 
storage in the capacity market (CM). Since the proposed regulatory changes at the UK and EU level 
are similar, the UK is taken as case study considering its market design and relevant regulations. 
The paper presented a SWOT analysis to explore the impact of the recent changes on the business 
potential of BESS and examined whether these regulatory changes have been supportive to BESS’s 
business case in the UK. 
Three main benefits of the recent regulatory changes are found. First, the removal of the double 
network charging for ES by eliminating the demand residual charges (when importing electricity 
from the grid) can reduce its operational cost. Second, ES co-location with RES sites that receive 
government subsidies can not only boost its business case but also recognises ES as a key player in 
integrating these intermittent resources. Third, facilitating ES access to the grid by allowing cost-
effective infrastructure access and planning permission can positively affect investment decision in 
ES. The recent regulation supported faster implementation of composite projects that have total 
capacity above 50 MW (for example a generation unit with 40 MW and ES with 40 MW). 
However, a number of drawbacks are found in the recent regulatory changes which may 
outweigh these benefits. First, the new definition for ES recognised it as a generation device thus it 
has to compete with traditional generators assets in many instances which it cannot do cost 
effectively. Second, the introduced regulations do not consider the different types and sizes of ES and 
tend to support large-scale ES with a capacity of 100 MW or above (similar to generators). However, 
there is a key role for smaller scale ES in current energy systems in the form of BESS as discussed in 
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the paper. From the perspective of the regulators this makes sense as they do not want to disrupt the 
current energy market structure by creating an independent storage asset class. Instead, they are 
looking for a technological advance for different types of ES to increase its energy and power density 
to place it with the traditional generator’s category. Third, only large-scale ES assets (above 100 MW) 
are exempted from paying FCLs, however, most of the current ES projects especially BESS are far 
below 100 MW. As such, in the case of BESS this might be a longtime coming limiting its value in 
current energy systems under current regulatory and market regimes. In the CM, for example, 
higher-duration BESS receives more payment that smaller-duration. 
Despite the previous drawbacks and a high current capital cost for BESS, many opportunities 
are found for private parties who are encouraged to own and operate ES devices to stack multiple 
revenues from different services. The recent regulation meant that private parties are in the best place 
to provide ES services. This is along with the suggestion that allows several ES units to be aggregated 
thus provide services in the wholesale market. 
Finally, we suggest a number of policy implications from the above SWOT analysis results. First, 
an independent asset class should be created for ES because the current energy markets are designed 
without electricity storage in mind. Second, a unique definition for ES that reflect its features is 
needed. For instance, the current definition for both the EU and the UK does not recognise the ES 
service when charging the device to help storing the exceeded power from a wind farm. Third, in the 
CM where the capacity of the BESS asset is de-rated, the economic assessment of the degradation cost 
should be taken into account. This because degradation can affect the availability of these assets 
which in turn can affect the reliability and the energy security of the electricity network should the 
implementation of ES is increased. 
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, A.G., T.C.; Methodology, A.G. T.C; Formal analysis, A.G., M.A.-G., 
M.S., T.C.; Investigation, T.C., M.S.; Writing—Original draft preparation, A.G., T.C.; Writing—Review and 
editing, T.C., M.A.-G., M.S.; Visualization, T.C.; Supervision, T.C., M.A.-G., M.S. 
Funding: This research received no external funding. 
Acknowledgments: Teesside University is gratefully acknowledged for fully supporting Ahmed′s PhD 
scholarship. We are grateful also to the two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions to improve the paper. 
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. 
References 
1. Narayanan, A.; Mets, K.; Strobbe, M.; Develder, C. Feasibility of 100% renewable energy-based electricity 
production for cities with storage and flexibility. Renewable Energy 2019, 134, 698-709, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2018.11.049. 
2. Rogge, N. EU countries’ progress towards ‘Europe 2020 strategy targets’. Journal of Policy Modeling 2019, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2019.03.003, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2019.03.003. 
3. Hübler, M.; Löschel, A. The EU Decarbonisation Roadmap 2050—What way to walk? Energy Policy 2013, 
55, 190-207, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.11.054. 
4. IRENA. Renwable Capacity Statistics; International Renewable Energy Agency: Abu Dhabi, UAE, 2019; 
https://www.irena.org/publications/2019/Mar/Capacity-Statistics-2019. 
5. IRENA , E.C. Renewable Energy Prospects for the European Union; Abu Dhabi , UAE, 2018; 
https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2018/Feb/IRENA_REmap-
EU_2018_summary.pdf?la=en&hash=818E3BDBFC16B90E1D0317C5AA5B07C8ED27F9EF. 
6. Notton, G.; Nivet, M.-L.; Voyant, C.; Paoli, C.; Darras, C.; Motte, F.; Fouilloy, A. Intermittent and stochastic 
character of renewable energy sources: Consequences, cost of intermittence and benefit of forecasting. 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 2018, 87, 96-105, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2018.02.007. 
Energies 2020, 13, x FOR PEER REVIEW 15 of 21 
 
7. McCormick, P.G.; Suehrcke, H. The effect of intermittent solar radiation on the performance of PV systems. 
Solar Energy 2018, 171, 667-674, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.solener.2018.06.043. 
8. Ren, G.; Liu, J.; Wan, J.; Guo, Y.; Yu, D. Overview of wind power intermittency: Impacts, measurements, 
and mitigation solutions. Applied Energy 2017, 204, 47-65, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.06.098. 
9. Brouwer, A.S.; van den Broek, M.; Seebregts, A.; Faaij, A. Impacts of large-scale Intermittent Renewable 
Energy Sources on electricity systems, and how these can be modeled. Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews 2014, 33, 443-466, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2014.01.076. 
10. Brouwer, A.S.; van den Broek, M.; Zappa, W.; Turkenburg, W.C.; Faaij, A. Least-cost options for integrating 
intermittent renewables in low-carbon power systems. Applied Energy 2016, 161, 48-74, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.09.090. 
11. Brouwer, A.S.; van den Broek, M.; Seebregts, A.; Faaij, A. Operational flexibility and economics of power 
plants in future low-carbon power systems. Applied Energy 2015, 156, 107-128, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.06.065. 
12. Williams, S.; Short, M.; Crosbie, T. On the use of thermal inertia in building stock to leverage decentralised 
demand side frequency regulation services. Applied Thermal Engineering 2018, 133, 97-106, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.applthermaleng.2018.01.035. 
13. Chattopadhyay, D.; Alpcan, T. Capacity and Energy-Only Markets Under High Renewable Penetration. 
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 2016, 31, 1692-1702, doi:10.1109/TPWRS.2015.2461675. 
14. Hossain, M.S.; Madlool, N.A.; Rahim, N.A.; Selvaraj, J.; Pandey, A.K.; Khan, A.F. Role of smart grid in 
renewable energy: An overview. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 2016, 60, 1168-1184, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.09.098. 
15. Peker, M.; Kocaman, A.S.; Kara, B.Y. Benefits of transmission switching and energy storage in power 
systems with high renewable energy penetration. Applied Energy 2018, 228, 1182-1197, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.07.008. 
16. IRENA. Electricity Storage and Renewables: Costs And Markets To 2030; Abu Dhabi,UAE, 2017; 
https://www.irena.org/publications/2017/Oct/Electricity-storage-and-renewables-costs-and-markets. 
17. Lorenzi, G.; da Silva Vieira, R.; Santos Silva, C.A.; Martin, A. Techno-economic analysis of utility-scale 
energy storage in island settings. Journal of Energy Storage 2019, 21, 691-705, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.est.2018.12.026. 
18. Ding, J.; Xu, Y.; Chen, H.; Sun, W.; Hu, S.; Sun, S. Value and economic estimation model for grid-scale 
energy storage in monopoly power markets. Applied Energy 2019, 240, 986-1002, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.02.063. 
19. Obi, M.; Jensen, S.M.; Ferris, J.B.; Bass, R.B. Calculation of levelized costs of electricity for various electrical 
energy storage systems. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 2017, 67, 908-920, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2016.09.043. 
20. Zakeri, B.; Syri, S. Electrical energy storage systems: A comparative life cycle cost analysis. Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews 2015, 42, 569-596, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2014.10.011. 
21. Martins, R.; Hesse, C.H.; Jungbauer, J.; Vorbuchner, T.; Musilek, P. Optimal Component Sizing for Peak 
Shaving in Battery Energy Storage System for Industrial Applications. Energies 2018, 11, 
doi:10.3390/en11082048. 
22. Kocer, C.M.; Cengiz, C.; Gezer, M.; Gunes, D.; Cinar, A.M.; Alboyaci, B.; Onen, A. Assessment of Battery 
Storage Technologies for a Turkish Power Network. Sustainability 2019, 11, doi:10.3390/su11133669. 
Energies 2020, 13, x FOR PEER REVIEW 16 of 21 
 
23. Gailani, A.; Al-Greer, M.; Short, M.; Crosbie, T. Degradation Cost Analysis of Li-Ion Batteries in the 
Capacity Market with Different Degradation Models. Electronics 2020, 9, doi:10.3390/electronics9010090. 
24. Rancilio, G.; Lucas, A.; Kotsakis, E.; Fulli, G.; Merlo, M.; Delfanti, M.; Masera, M. Modeling a Large-Scale 
Battery Energy Storage System for Power Grid Application Analysis. Energies 2019, 12, 
doi:10.3390/en12173312. 
25. Harlow, J.E.; Ma, X.; Li, J.; Logan, E.; Liu, Y.; Zhang, N.; Ma, L.; Glazier, S.L.; Cormier, M.M.E.; Genovese, 
M., et al. A Wide Range of Testing Results on an Excellent Lithium-Ion Cell Chemistry to be used as 
Benchmarks for New Battery Technologies. Journal of The Electrochemical Society 2019, 166, A3031-A3044, 
doi:10.1149/2.0981913jes. 
26. BloombergNEF. New Energy Outlook.; New York, USA, 2018; 
https://bnef.turtl.co/story/neo2018?teaser=true. 
27. Sandia National Laboratories. Energy Storage for the Electricity Grid: Benefits and Market Potential Assessment 
Guide; California, USA, 2010; https://www.sandia.gov/ess-ssl/publications/SAND2010-0815.pdf. 
28. Forrester, S.P.; Zaman, A.; Mathieu, J.L.; Johnson, J.X. Policy and market barriers to energy storage 
providing multiple services. The Electricity Journal 2017, 30, 50-56, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2017.10.001. 
29. Anuta, O.H.; Taylor, P.; Jones, D.; McEntee, T.; Wade, N. An international review of the implications of 
regulatory and electricity market structures on the emergence of grid scale electricity storage. Renewable 
and Sustainable Energy Reviews 2014, 38, 489-508, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2014.06.006. 
30. Hamelink, M.; Opdenakker, R. How business model innovation affects firm performance in the energy 
storage market. Renewable Energy 2019, 131, 120-127, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2018.07.051. 
31. Poyry. Storage Business Models In The GB Market; London, UK, 2014; 
http://www.poyry.com/sites/default/files/374_elexon_storagebusinessmodelsandgbmarket_v2_0.pdf. 
32. EU Commission. Energy storage – the role of electricity; Brussels, Belgium, 2017; 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/swd2017_61_document_travail_service_part1_v6.
pdf. 
33. OFGEM. Upgrading our energy system: smart systems and flexibility plan; London, UK, 2017; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/upgrading-our-energy-system-smart-systems-and-
flexibility-plan. 
34. Faunce, T.A.; Prest, J.; Su, D.; Hearne, S.J.; Iacopi, F. On-grid batteries for large-scale energy storage: 
Challenges and opportunities for policy and technology. MRS Energy & Sustainability 2018, 5, E11, 
doi:10.1557/mre.2018.11. 
35. EA Technology. A Good Practice Guide on Electrical Energy Storage; Chester, UK, 2014; 
https://www.eatechnology.com/engineering-projects/electrical-energy-storage/. 
36. Argyrou, M.C.; Christodoulides, P.; Kalogirou, S.A. Energy storage for electricity generation and related 
processes: Technologies appraisal and grid scale applications. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 
2018, 94, 804-821, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2018.06.044. 
37. EuroBat. Battery Energy Storage in The EU- Barriers, Opportunities, Services & Benefits; Germany, 2016; 
https://www.eurobat.org/news-publications/publications. 
38. Castagneto Gissey, G.; Dodds, P.E.; Radcliffe, J. Market and regulatory barriers to electrical energy storage 
innovation. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 2018, 82, 781-790, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.09.079. 
Energies 2020, 13, x FOR PEER REVIEW 17 of 21 
 
39. Staffell, I.; Rustomji, M. Maximising the value of electricity storage. Journal of Energy Storage 2016, 8, 212-
225, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.est.2016.08.010. 
40. Ruz, F.C.; Pollitt, M.G. Overcoming Barriers to Electrical Energy Storage:Comparing California and 
Europe. 2016, 17, 123-149, doi:10.1177/178359171601700202. 
41. Rappaport, R.D.; Miles, J. Cloud energy storage for grid scale applications in the UK. Energy Policy 2017, 
109, 609-622, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.07.044. 
42. He, X.; Delarue, E.; D'Haeseleer, W.; Glachant, J.-M. A novel business model for aggregating the values of 
electricity storage. Energy Policy 2011, 39, 1575-1585, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.12.033. 
43. Dusonchet, L.; Favuzza, S.; Massaro, F.; Telaretti, E.; Zizzo, G. Technological and legislative status point of 
stationary energy storages in the EU. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 2019, 101, 158-167, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2018.11.004. 
44. Wasowicz, B.; Koopmann, S.; Dederichs, T.; Schnettler, A.; Spaetling, U. Evaluating regulatory and market 
frameworks for energy storage deployment in electricity grids with high renewable energy penetration. In 
Proceedings of 2012 9th International Conference on the European Energy Market, 10-12 May 2012; pp. 1-
8. 
45. Usera, I.; Rodilla, P.; Burger, S.; Herrero, I.; Batlle, C. The Regulatory Debate About Energy Storage Systems: 
State of the Art and Open Issues. IEEE Power and Energy Magazine 2017, 15, 42-50, 
doi:10.1109/MPE.2017.2708859. 
46. The Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking. Commercialisation of Energy Storage in Europe; Brussels, 
Belgium, 2015; 
https://www.fch.europa.eu/sites/default/files/CommercializationofEnergyStorageFinal_3.pdf. 
47. Zame, K.K.; Brehm, C.A.; Nitica, A.T.; Richard, C.L.; Schweitzer Iii, G.D. Smart grid and energy storage: 
Policy recommendations. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 2018, 82, 1646-1654, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.07.011. 
48. Taylor, P.G.; Bolton, R.; Stone, D.; Upham, P. Developing pathways for energy storage in the UK using a 
coevolutionary framework. Energy Policy 2013, 63, 230-243, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.08.070. 
49. Ferreira, R.; Matos, M.; Lopes, J.P. Regulatory issues in the deployment of distributed storage devices in 
distribution networks. In Proceedings of 2016 13th International Conference on the European Energy 
Market (EEM), 6-9 June 2016; pp. 1-6. 
50. Yan, X.; Gu, C.; Li, F.; Xiang, Y. Network pricing for customer-operated energy storage in distribution 
networks. Applied Energy 2018, 212, 283-292, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.12.060. 
51. Carbon Trust; Imperial College London. Can storage help reduce the cost of a future UK electricity system?; 2016; 
https://www.carbontrust.com/media/672486/energy-storage-report.pdf. 
52. Strbac, G.; Aunedi, M.; Konstantelos, I.; Moreira, R.; Teng, F.; Moreno, R.; Pudjianto, D.; Laguna, A.; 
Papadopoulos, P. Opportunities for Energy Storage: Assessing Whole-System Economic Benefits of Energy 
Storage in Future Electricity Systems. IEEE Power and Energy Magazine 2017, 15, 32-41, 
doi:10.1109/MPE.2017.2708858. 
53. Hu, J.; Harmsen, R.; Crijns-Graus, W.; Worrell, E.; van den Broek, M. Identifying barriers to large-scale 
integration of variable renewable electricity into the electricity market: A literature review of market 
design. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 2018, 81, 2181-2195, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.06.028. 
Energies 2020, 13, x FOR PEER REVIEW 18 of 21 
 
54. Abdon, A.; Zhang, X.; Parra, D.; Patel, M.K.; Bauer, C.; Worlitschek, J. Techno-economic and environmental 
assessment of stationary electricity storage technologies for different time scales. Energy 2017, 139, 1173-
1187, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2017.07.097. 
55. National Grid. Future Energy Scenarios; London, UK, 2015; http://fes.nationalgrid.com/fes-document/. 
56. Bradbury, S.; Hayling, J.; Papadopoulos, P.; Heyward, N. Smarter Network Storage Electricity Storage in GB: 
SNS 4.7 Recommendations for regulatory and legal framework (SDRC 9.5); 2015; 
http://innovation.ukpowernetworks.co.uk/innovation/en/Projects/tier-2-projects/Smarter-Network-
Storage-(SNS)/. 
57. OFGEM. Clarifying the regulatory framework for electricity storage: licensing. London, UK, Office of Gas and 
Electricity Markets; London, UK, 2017; https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/clarifying-
regulatory-framework-electricity-storage-licensing. 
58. Schermeyer, H.; Vergara, C.; Fichtner, W. Renewable energy curtailment: A case study on today's and 
tomorrow's congestion management. Energy Policy 2018, 112, 427-436, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.10.037. 
59. Bradbury, S.; Laguna, A.; Papadopoulos, P. Electricity Storage in GB: Final evaluation of the Smarter Network 
Storage solution (SDRC 9.8); 2016; http://innovation.ukpowernetworks.co.uk/innovation/en/Projects/tier-2-
projects/Smarter-Network-Storage-(SNS)/. 
60. Pearce, P.; Slade, R. Feed-in tariffs for solar microgeneration: Policy evaluation and capacity projections 
using a realistic agent-based model. Energy Policy 2018, 116, 95-111, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.01.060. 
61. Woodman, B.; Mitchell, C. Learning from experience? The development of the Renewables Obligation in 
England and Wales 2002–2010. Energy Policy 2011, 39, 3914-3921, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.03.074. 
62. OFGEM. Guidance for generators: Co-location of electricity storage facilities with renewable generation supported 
under the Renewables Obligation or Feed-in Tariff schemes London, UK, 2018; 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/guidance-generators-co-location-electricity-
storage-facilities-renewable-generation-supported-under-renewables-obligation-or-feed-tariff-schemes-
version-1. 
63. OFGEM. Feed-in Tariffs: Guidance for Licensed Electricity Suppliers (Version 10); London, UK, 2018; 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/feed-tariffs-guidance-licensed-electricity-suppliers-
version-10. 
64. BEIS. Contracts For Difference Government response to the consultation on changes to the CFD contract and CFD 
regulations; London, UK, 2017; 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/58999
6/FINAL_-_Government_Response_to_the_CFD_Contract_Changes_Consultation.pdf. 
65. Norton Rose Fulbright. Regulatory progress for energy storage in Europe. Availabe online: 
https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/8b5285f4/regulatory-progress-for-
energy-storage-in-europe (accessed on 18 Apr 2019). 
66. OFGEM. Open letter on implications of charging reform on electricity storage; London, UK, 2019; 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/open-letter-implications-charging-reform-
electricity-storage. 
Energies 2020, 13, x FOR PEER REVIEW 19 of 21 
 
67. OFGEM. Targeted charging review: minded to decision and draft impact assessment; London, UK, 2018; 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/targeted-charging-review-minded-decision-and-
draft-impact-assessment. 
68. OFGEM. Targeted Charging Review: a consultation; London, UK, 2017; 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/targeted-charging-review-consultation. 
69. Khan, A.S.M.; Verzijlbergh, R.A.; Sakinci, O.C.; De Vries, L.J. How do demand response and electrical 
energy storage affect (the need for) a capacity market? Applied Energy 2018, 214, 39-62, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.01.057. 
70. National Grid. T-4 Capacity Market Auction for 2020/21; London, UK, 2016; 
https://www.emrdeliverybody.com/CM/T-4-Auction-2016.aspx. 
71. National Grid. Duration-Limited Storage De-Rating Factor Assessment – Final Report; London, UK, 2017; 
https://www.emrdeliverybody.com/Lists/Latest%20News/Attachments/150/Duration%20Limited%20Stor
age%20De-Rating%20Factor%20Assessment%20-%20Final.pdf. 
72. EU Comission. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal market in 
electricity (recast); Brussels, Belgium, 2016; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016PC0864R%2801%29. 
73. Graditi, G.; Ippolito, M.G.; Telaretti, E.; Zizzo, G. Technical and economical assessment of distributed 
electrochemical storages for load shifting applications: An Italian case study. Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews 2016, 57, 515-523, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.12.195. 
74. OFGEM. Enabling the competitive deployment of storage in a flexible energy system: decision on changes to the 
electricity distribution licence; London, UK, 2018; https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-
updates/enabling-competitive-deployment-storage-flexible-energy-system-statutory-consultation-
changes-electricity-distribution-licence. 
75. EU Commission. Technical information on Projects of Common Interest; London, UK, 2018; 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/technical_document_3rd_list_with_subheadings.pdf. 
76. BEIS. Consultation on Proposals Regarding The Planning System for Electricity Storage; London, UK, 2019; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/the-treatment-of-electricity-storage-within-the-planning-
system. 
77. Chang, H.-H.; Huang, W.-C. Application of a quantification SWOT analytical method. Mathematical and 
Computer Modelling 2006, 43, 158-169, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mcm.2005.08.016. 
78. Huang, J.; Fan, J.; Furbo, S. Feasibility study on solar district heating in China. Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews 2019, 108, 53-64, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2019.03.014. 
79. Njoh, A.J. The SWOT model's utility in evaluating energy technology: Illustrative application of a modified 
version to assess the sawdust cookstove's sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa. Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews 2017, 69, 313-323, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2016.11.049. 
80. Igliński, B.; Iglińska, A.; Koziński, G.; Skrzatek, M.; Buczkowski, R. Wind energy in Poland – History, 
current state, surveys, Renewable Energy Sources Act, SWOT analysis. Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews 2016, 64, 19-33, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2016.05.081. 
81. Wang, Q.; Li, R. Impact of cheaper oil on economic system and climate change: A SWOT analysis. Renewable 
and Sustainable Energy Reviews 2016, 54, 925-931, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.10.087. 
82. Scottish and Southern Electricity Power Distribution. Trial of Orkney Energy Storage Park SSET1009; UK, 
2013; https://www.ssen.co.uk/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=7305. 
Energies 2020, 13, x FOR PEER REVIEW 20 of 21 
 
83. Krajačić, G.; Duić, N.; Tsikalakis, A.; Zoulias, M.; Caralis, G.; Panteri, E.; Carvalho, M.d.G. Feed-in tariffs 
for promotion of energy storage technologies. Energy Policy 2011, 39, 1410-1425, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.12.013. 
84. Grantham, A.; Pudney, P.; Ward, L.A.; Whaley, D.; Boland, J. The viability of electrical energy storage for 
low-energy households. Solar Energy 2017, 155, 1216-1224, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.solener.2017.07.063. 
85. Solar Trade Association. Ofgem clarification removes barrier to battery storage for 900,000 solar homes; London, 
UK, 2018; https://www.solar-trade.org.uk/press-release-ofgem-clarification-removes-barrier-to-battery-
storage-for-900000-solar-homes/. 
86. Renewables UK. Energy storage capacity set to soar, 300 UK-based companies involved in new sector; London, 
UK, 2018; https://www.renewableuk.com/news/425522/Energy-storage-capacity-set-to-soar-300-UK-
based-companies-involved-in-new-sector.htm. 
87. Zillman, D.; Godden, L.; Paddock, L.R.; Roggenkamp, M. Innovation in Energy Law and Technology: Dynamic 
Solutions for Energy Transitions; OUP Oxford: 2018. 
88. Northern Powergrid. Customer-Led Network Revolution Project Closedown Report; Newcastle Upon Tyne, UK, 
2015; http://www.networkrevolution.co.uk/project-library/project-closedown-report-2/. 
89. UK Power Networks. Smarter Network Storage Close-Down Report; London, UK, 2017; 
http://innovation.ukpowernetworks.co.uk/innovation/en/Projects/tier-2-projects/Smarter-Network-
Storage-(SNS)/. 
90. Western Power Distrbituion. Developing Future Power Networks Project FALCON Close Down Report; Bristol, 
UK, 2016; https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/wpd-s-falcon-project-closedown-report. 
91. Scottish and Southern Energy Power Distribution. LCNF Tier 1 Close-Down Report Orkney Energy Storage 
Park; UK, 2012; https://www.ssen.co.uk/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=7305. 
92. Scottish and Southern Energy Power Distribution. NINES Project Closedown Report; UK, 2017; 
https://www.ninessmartgrid.co.uk/library/nines-closedown-report/. 
93. Scottish and Southern Energy Power Distribution. LCNF Tier 1 Closedown Report Low Voltage Connected 
Energy Storage; UK, 2017; 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2014/08/sset1008_lv_connected_batteries_closedown_2
nd_submission_0.pdf. 
94. UK Power Networks. Smarter Network Storage - business model consultation; London, UK, 2017; 
https://www.ukpowernetworks.co.uk/internet/en/community/documents/Smarter-Network-Storage-
Business-model-consultation.pdf. 
95. National Grid. Future Energy Scenarios; London, UK, 2017; http://fes.nationalgrid.com/fes-document/fes-
2017/. 
96. SMA System Technology. SMA System Technology Deployed in Europe’s Largest Battery Storage Project. 
Availabe online: https://www.sma.de/en/newsroom/current-news/news-details/news/3411-sma-system-
technology-deployed-in-europes-largest-battery-storage-project.html (accessed on 17 Apr 2019). 
97. National Grid. T-4 Capacity Market Auction for 2021/22; London, UK, 2018; 
https://www.emrdeliverybody.com/Lists/Latest%20News/DispForm.aspx?ID=175&IsDlg=1. 
98. National Grid. Capacity Market Registers; London, UK, 2019; 
https://www.emrdeliverybody.com/CM/Registers.aspx. 
99. Winfield, M.; Shokrzadeh, S.; Jones, A. Energy policy regime change and advanced energy storage: A 
comparative analysis. Energy Policy 2018, 115, 572-583, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.01.029. 
Energies 2020, 13, x FOR PEER REVIEW 21 of 21 
 
100. Burger, S.; Chaves-Ávila, J.P.; Batlle, C.; Pérez-Arriaga, I.J. A review of the value of aggregators in electricity 
systems. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 2017, 77, 395-405, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.04.014. 
101. Contreras-Ocana, J.; Ortega-Vazquez, M.; Zhang, B. Participation of an Energy Storage Aggregator in 
Electricity Markets. In Proceedings of 2018 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM), 5-10 
Aug. 2018; pp. 1-1. 
102. Castagneto Gissey, G.; Subkhankulova, D.; Dodds, P.E.; Barrett, M. Value of energy storage aggregation to 
the electricity system. Energy Policy 2019, 128, 685-696, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.01.037. 
103. EU Commission. Common rules for the internal electricity market; Brussels, Belgium, 2019; 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/595924/EPRS_BRI(2017)595924_EN.pdf. 
104. Bray, R.; Woodman, B. Barriers to Independent Aggregators in Europe; University of Exeter: 2019; 
https://bit.ly/2FH6sr5. 
105. Schmidt, O.; Hawkes, A.; Gambhir, A.; Staffell, I. The future cost of electrical energy storage based on 
experience rates. Nature Energy 2017, 2, 17110, doi:10.1038/nenergy.2017.110 
106. Few, S.; Schmidt, O.; Offer, G.J.; Brandon, N.; Nelson, J.; Gambhir, A. Prospective improvements in cost 
and cycle life of off-grid lithium-ion battery packs: An analysis informed by expert elicitations. Energy 
Policy 2018, 114, 578-590, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.12.033. 
107. The energyst. a business case for battery storage?; [Online], 2017; 
http://www.electricitystorage.co.uk/files/7615/0900/7557/Battery_Storage_Report_2017_28pp_cropped0.1.
pdf. 
108. Lockwood, M.; Froggatt, A.; Wright, G.; Dutton, J. The implications of Brexit for the electricity sector in 
Great Britain: Trade-offs between market integration and policy influence. Energy Policy 2017, 110, 137-143, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.08.021. 
109. Mayer, P.; Ball, S.C.; Vögele, S.; Kuckshinrichs, W.; Rübbelke, D. Analyzing Brexit: Implications for the 
Electricity System of Great Britain. Energies 2019, 12, doi:10.3390/en12173212. 
110. Geske, J.; Green, R.; Staffell, I. Elecxit: The cost of bilaterally uncoupling British-EU electricity trade. Energy 
Economics 2020, 85, 104599, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2019.104599. 
111. The Faraday Institution. The Gigafactory Boom: the Demand for Battery Manufacturing in the UK; Oxford, UK, 
2019; https://faraday.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Faraday_Insights-2_FINAL.pdf. 
1.  
2. © 2020 by the authors. Submitted for possible open access publication under 
the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) 
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). 
 
